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ABSTRACT
We present the results of an initial analysis conducted on a real-life
setting to quantify the effect of shilling attacks on recommender
systems. We focus on both algorithm performance as well as the
types of users who are most affected by these attacks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The effect of shilling attacks on recommender systems, where mali-
cious users create fake profiles so that they can then manipulate
algorithms by providing fake reviews or ratings, have been long
studied. Previous work has characterized and modeled shilling
attacks on recommenders, defined new metrics to quantify the
impacts of these attacks on known recommender algorithms, and
applied a detect+filtering approach to mitigate the effects of spam-
mers on recommendations (see recent survey [1]). We observe
from the literature that empirical analysis thus far has focused on
assessing the robustness of recommender systems via simulated
attacks [1, 10]. Unfortunately, there is lack of evidence on what is
the impact of fake reviews or fake ratings in a real-world setting.
We present a preliminary analysis conducted to understand the
influence of fraudulent reviews on the recommendation process.
We do this through an initial study on known datasets with gold
standards in different domains and a commonly-used recommenda-
tion algorithm. Our goal is to shed light on the effect of this attack
and identify gaps to be addressed in the future by seamlessly con-
necting recommender and data mining research, as the latter has a
rich body of work when it comes to spam detection and prevention.
2 ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
Datasets.We use two real-world datasets (Table 1) that offer infor-
mation about fraudulent reviews, which we treat as ground truth.
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Dataset Users Items Ratings Spammers
Amazon-Beauty 167,725 29,004 252,056 3.26%
Amazon-Health 311,636 39,539 428,781 4.12%
Yelp!-Hotel 5,027 72 5,857 14.92%
Yelp!-Restaurant 34,523 129 66,060 20.25%
Table 1: Summary of datasets
Yelp! [8]: This dataset consists of Yelp reviews from two domains:
hotels (YH) and restaurants (YR). Yelp filters fake/suspicious re-
views and puts them in a spam list. A study found the Yelp filter to
be highly accurate [11] and researchers have used filtered spam re-
views as ground truth for spammer detection (e.g., [9]). Spammers,
in our case, are users who wrote at least one filtered review.
Amazon [6]: Here we consider reviews from two domains: beauty
(AB) and health (AH). In this case, we define ground truth following
the framework in [2], which is based on helpfulness votes. Thus,
we treat as a spammer every user who wrote at least one review in
which he rated a product as 4 or 5 and has helpfulness ratio ≤ 0.4.
Experimental setting. In this paper, we analyze the robustness
to shilling attacks of matrix factorization (MF), a commonly-used
recommender algorithm.We used probabilisticMF [7] with 40 latent
factors and 150 iterations. We performed 5-fold cross-validation and
measured the performance in terms of RMSE1 only for non-spam
users.We also used prediction shift (PS), a measure explicitly defined
to quantify the impact of spammer attacks on recommenders, which
captures the average changes in predicted ratings [1] 2.
3 RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS
We discuss the effect of fake reviews on recommendations offered
to users in real-world scenarios, as opposed to simulated attacks.
Do spam ratings affect recommendations? By following the
classical evaluation framework for shilling attacks on recommender
systems [1], we measured the performances on the original dataset
(with spam) and when we remove all the reviews written by spam-
mers (shilling attack). We report the results of our assessment in
Table 2.
We anticipated a lower RMSE when removing spam. However,
we did not observe this trend among most datasets in our study.
This result aligns with previous work reporting (simulated) shilling
attacks are not detectable using traditional measures of algorithm
performance [5]. Previous works also show PS values ranging from
0.5 to 1.5 when shilling attacks are simulated. However, we observe
very low values in real-world scenarios: in our case, considered, PS
ranges from 0.047 to 0.15, which we argue is not enough to promote
1Using hitRatio, we obtained similar outcomes. Thus, due to space limitations, we
excluded that metric from our discussion.
2In addition to PS, we considered stability of prediction, another common measure to
quantify spammer attacks. As it is inversely proportional to PS, we only report PS.
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Figure 1: Yelp-Restaurants (YR); RMSE differences for
ranges [0.4,0.5] and [0.7,1] are significant, p < 0.001.
or demote products attacked by the spammers. We believe this to
be one of the reasons why algorithm robustness is not reflected by
average metrics like RMSE. Further, looking at users as a whole
does not help us quantify how much spammers are able to deceit
recommenders or who are the users that are affected the most.
Dataset W/ Spammers(RMSE, PS)
W/o Spammers
RMSE
Amazon-Beauty (0.871, 0.122) 0.901
Amazon-Health (1.056, 0.047) 1.053
Yelp!-Hotel (1.124, 0.150) 1.125
Yelp!-Restaurant (1.039, 0.133) 1.034
Table 2: RSME and PS on datasets with and without spam.
Who is really affected by spammers? To better understand
which users are really affected by spammers, we analyzed users
based on their reliability: the ability of a user to rate a product
according to what it deserves; as in [4]. The rating a product de-
serves often aligns with what the majority of benign users think
about that product given that they outnumber spam users. Then, a
reliable user is one that always rates according to what a product
deserves, whereas an unreliable user deviates from that value. It
seems, however, that by this definition spammers are unreliable as
they may try to promote or demote a product by rating it differently
than benign users. However, benign users may also be mistakenly
treated as unreliable users, if they happen to be the type of users
that disagree with average ratings assigned by the majority.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the RMSE varies according to the
reliability of the users and the distribution of user reliability in YR
and AH3. We observe that spammers and benign users have similar
reliability distributions. Unfortunately, this is why spammers are
able to camouflage as benign users very well, in terms of reliabil-
ity. Regarding RMSE, we see that benign users that benefit from
removing spam when generating recommendations are either unre-
liable users or very reliable ones. This result depends on spammers’
reliability. Intuitively, the users more affected by spammers are the
ones exhibiting a rating behavior very different from the spammers.
Thus, traditional spammers, i.e., unreliable ones, impact reliable
benign users (right tail of the plots), while smart spammers, i.e.,
the ones that are able to camouflage themselves as reliable benign
users, affect unreliable benign users, i.e., those who disagree with
the average (left tail). This latter result aligns with what observed
3Results are similar for the other two datasets, excluded for space limitations.
Figure 2: Amazon-Health (AH); RMSE differences for ranges
[0.2,0.4] and [0.7-1] are significant p < 0.01.
for trust-based recommenders [3], which is not unexpected if we
think of spammers as untrusted users in the network, in our case.
Overall, 26.6% (4%, 5.6%, 0.7%) of benign users receive worse
recommendations in presence of spam on YR (YH, AH, AB, resp.).
We infer that the high (low, resp.) percentage observed for YR (AB,
resp.) is due to the proportion of spam in the dataset (see Table 1).
In a real-world scenario, the aforementioned percentages would
translate into hundreds of thousands of users who would not be
equally satisfied by recommenders that are not robust to shilling
attacks. We believe this to be why this area warrants further study
to make recommender algorithms not only more robust, but also
able to better serve all type of users through stricter spam detection.
4 CONCLUSIONS & FUTUREWORK
We have presented the results of an initial empirical analysis that
has allowed us to demonstrate that trends observed as a result of
simulated shilling attacks on recommender algorithms remain the
same in a real-world scenario. We validated that average metrics are
not able to properly capture attack effect and that in the presence of
spam, recommender algorithms are not uniformly robust for all type
of benign users. These initial discoveries lead us to argue in favor
of new algorithms that are not only robust to attacks, but that also
ensure that all users are protected against spam while supporting
spam detection that accurately spots the subset of spammers who
in fact affect recommendations without mistreating non-traditional
users (i.e., users whose taste differs from the popular) as spammers.
REFERENCES
[1] Robin Burke, Michael O’Mahony, and Neil Hurley. 2015. Robust collaborative
recommendation. In Recommender systems handbook. Springer, 961–995.
[2] Amir Fayazi, Kyumin Lee, James Caverlee, and Anna Squicciarini. 2015. Uncov-
ering Crowdsourced Manipulation of Online Reviews. In SIGIR. 233–242.
[3] Jennifer Golbeck. 2006. Generating predictive movie recommendations from
trust in social networks. In iTrust. Springer, 93–104.
[4] Srijan Kumar, Francesca Spezzano, V. S. Subrahmanian, and Christos Faloutsos.
2016. Edge Weight Prediction in Weighted Signed Networks. In ICDM. 221–230.
[5] Shyong K. Lam and John Riedl. 2004. Shilling recommender systems for fun and
profit. In WWW. 393–402.
[6] Julian McAuley and Jure Leskovec. 2013. From amateurs to connoisseurs: model-
ing the evolution of user expertise through online reviews. In WWW. 897–908.
[7] Andriy Mnih and Ruslan Salakhutdinov. 2008. Probabilistic matrix factorization.
In NIPS. 1257–1264.
[8] Arjun Mukherjee, Vivek Venkataraman, Bing Liu, and Natalie S. Glance. 2013.
What Yelp Fake Review Filter Might Be Doing?. In ICWSM. 409–418.
[9] Shebuti Rayana and Leman Akoglu. 2015. Collective Opinion Spam Detection:
Bridging Review Networks and Metadata. In SIGKDD. 985–994.
[10] Carlos E Seminario. 2013. Accuracy and robustness impacts of power user attacks
on collaborative recommender systems. In RecSys. ACM, 447–450.
[11] Karen Weise. 2011. A Lie Detector Test for Online Reviewers. In Bloomberg
BusinessWeek.
